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Abstract: - Functions vital to our society and critical infrastructures — energy, water, transportation, 
communication, critical information infrastructure — lacks of resilience, typically losing essential functionality 
following adverse events. In the future, the number of climatic extremes may intensify or become more frequent, 
and building resilience becomes the optimal course of action for large complex systems. This multiple case study 
research analyses five prior research projects from critical infrastructure protection, smart cities and security 
fields. The target of the paper is to research how resilience management of critical systems and functions vital to 
society can be understood. The study indicates that situational awareness and continuous learning are 
prerequisites for resilience. 
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1 Introduction 
The research field of function vital to society is a 
multidisciplinary topic. Existing empirical research is 
characterized by a considerable degree of 
fragmentation among different research programs 
and different geographic regions. For urban areas, the 
concept of resilient smart cities offers tremendous 
potential for innovation and development of new 
technologies and services. At the same time, the 
increasing "smartness" of urban environments 
introduce both threats and opportunities related to 
societal security, safety and resilience. Thus, we 
regard the concept to be of high societal importance. 
The research field of resilient smart cities is still in its 
infancy. The topic requires the development of new 
concepts, approaches and establishing 
multidisciplinary collaboration between research 
groups and stakeholders that rarely collaborate with 
each other. This underlines the need for a 
multidisciplinary network to pave the way for future 
research efforts on resilient cyber-physical systems 
(CPS). 
The present article is a multiple case study 
research (MCSR) aimed at the research question 
formulated in the title: How can resilience 
management of functions vital to society be 
understood? 
 
 
2 Research Approach 
Figure 1 shows how MCSR is applied in this 
research. The initial step in designing MCSR consists 
of theory development, and the next steps are case 
selection and definition of specific measures in the 
design and data collection process. Each individual 
case study consists of a whole study, and then 
conclusions of each case are considered to be the 
replication by other individual cases. Both the 
individual case and the multiple-result should be the 
focus of a summary report. For each individual case, 
the report should indicate how and why a particular 
result is demonstrated. Across cases, the report 
should present the extent of replication logic, 
including certain and contrasting results [1]. 
In figure 1, the dashed-line feedback represents a 
discovery situation, where one of the cases does not 
suit the original multiple-case study design. Such a 
discovery implies a need to reconsider the original 
theoretical propositions. At this point, redesign 
should take place before proceeding further, and in 
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this view the replication approach represents a way 
of generalizing that uses a type of test called 
falsification or refutation, which is the possibility that 
a theory or hypothesis may be proven wrong or 
falsified [2]. 
 
 
3 Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1 Main Threats and Risks of Critical 
Infrastructure 
As Fig. 2 presents, critical infrastructures are key 
state assets that will provide the functions vital to 
society. Safety deals with the risks arising from the 
system and potentially impacting the environment, 
whereas security is concerned with the risks 
originating from the environment and potentially 
impacting the system [3]. Security analysis provides 
what should be protected and which threaten the 
assets. The risk of execution of threats is determined 
in the security analysis; risk is the probability that the 
threat has become. According to Czech safety 
analysis, fundamental threats to critical infrastructure 
are: 1) natural disasters, 2) technological accidents, 
3) cyber-attacks, 4) criminal activities, and 5) 
terrorist attacks [4]. 
Natural disasters that act negatively on the 
functionality of critical infrastructure vary between 
countries being e.g. floods, torrential rain, gales and 
heavy snow [4]. Technological accidents represent 
incidents that have a negative effect on functionality, 
structure and integrity of the system due to internal 
factors that may be faults, failures and other 
unreliability, causing uncontrolled degradation and 
destruction of functions [4]. Cyber-attacks are 
targeted activities against information assets of 
critical infrastructure elements in order to obtain, 
modify or destroy the data or degrade or destroy the 
information system [4]. Criminal activity is an illegal 
activity in order to illegally obtain or relegating to 
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Fig.1 Multiple-case study method of this research 
 
 
Fig. 2 Critical infrastructures and functions vital to 
society [5] 
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destroy elements of critical infrastructure [4]. A 
terrorist attack is usually illegal activities leading to 
the degradation or destruction of critical 
infrastructure elements to support the enforcement of 
its policy goals [4]. 
 
 
3.1 Resilience Management of Cyber-physical 
Systems 
According to Linkov et al. [6], resilience, as a 
property of a system, must transition from just a 
buzzword to an operational paradigm for system 
management. Revolutionary advances in hardware, 
networking, information and human interface 
technologies require new ways of thinking about how 
CPS are conceptualized, built and evaluated [7]. 
Currently, a development of a design theory (DT) for 
resilient CPS is on a way so that communities 
developing and operating different information and 
security technologies can share knowledge and best 
practices using a common frame of reference [8]. 
The National Academy of Sciences identifies four 
event management cycles that a system needs to 
maintain to be resilient [9]: 1) Plan/Prepare: Lay the 
foundation to keep services available and assets 
functioning during a disruptive event (malfunction or 
attack). 2) Absorb: Maintain most critical asset 
function and service availability while repelling or 
isolating the disruption. 3) Recover: Restore all asset 
function and service availability to their pre-event 
functionality. 4) Adapt: Using knowledge from the 
event, alter protocol, configuration of the system, 
personnel training, or other aspects to become more 
resilient. The Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) 
doctrine identifies four domains that create shared 
situational awareness and inform decentralized 
decision-making [10]: 1) Physical: Physical 
resources and the capabilities and the design of those 
resources. 2) Information: Information and 
information development about the physical domain. 
3) Cognitive: Use of the information and physical do-
mains to make decisions. 4) Social: Organization 
structure and communication for making cognitive 
decisions. Linkov et al. [11] combined the event 
management cycles and NCW domains to create 
resilience metrics for cyber systems. Their approach 
integrates multiple domains of resilience and system 
response to threats through integrated resilience 
metrics; however, study of systems as multi-domain 
networks is relatively uncommon. Links across 
domains are likely to affect the network’s resilience 
and should be assessed using network science tools 
[12]. 
 
 
3.2   Smart Cities 
Smart Cities is becoming more and more complex, 
not least with regard to security aspects following a 
decade of continuous threats to our existing and 
planned large scale urban built infrastructure. Such 
infrastructure are critical nodes within the 
intertwined networks of these urban areas, which 
include not only physical components, but also 
integrated hardware and software aspects. To date, a 
comprehensive and holistic (systematic) approach to 
improve the resilience and security of large scale 
urban developments against attacks and disruptions 
has not been developed thoroughly. 
The understating of modern cyber-physical 
systems’ behavior and their dynamics, and the insight 
into capabilities and risks associated with smart 
systems integration into modern society can provide 
an important contribution to European security and 
safety in the near future. 
The system approach provides a number of new 
opportunities and opens new challenges. It provides 
a structured interface between social systems and 
technology research. It allows for the exchange of 
data and information between humanistic, social, 
behavioral research, risk management, resilience, and 
ICT-related research activities and projects. It will 
facilitate the application of analytical and modelling 
methods to the complex socio-techno-economic 
processes related to safety, security, resilience and 
survivability. The system and system of systems 
approaches have the potential to provide an interface 
with experimental research that could benefit from 
existing European Living labs and test beds. 
However Smart City research today has been lacking 
this systems concept and systematic approach, and 
the connection between basic research and the Living 
Labs experimental research platforms has not yet 
been well developed yet. 
The humanistic security research related to 
cultural, societal and behavioral aspects of risk 
management has until now been carried out mostly in 
isolation from system and technological research. 
The potential of the techno-societal system of 
systems concept as an integrator for societal, 
technological and economic dimensions of resilience 
and smart cities research has not yet been exploited 
at its full capacity. 
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The development and integration of artificial 
intelligence based smart ICT systems into city 
management and the daily life of the urban 
population has the potential to considerably improve 
the security of citizens and society generally. It 
presents huge potential for innovation. At the same 
time smart ICT systems present serious challenges 
and risks for society and citizens if applied 
inappropriately. A better understanding of complex 
techno-social urban systems will provide an insight 
into the underlying systemic processes involved. This 
will improve our ability to model and reduce these 
risks. Smart Cities research can benefit from the 
latest developments in Internet of Things (IoT), Big 
Data, Cloud Computing, Cloud Services, Social 
Media and Social Networks. Interoperability at all 
levels presents a serious challenge today. 
Standardization activities for Smart Cities have not 
yet been started by the leading standardization bodies 
in Europe - ETSI and CENELEC. 
 
 
4 Empirical Cases  
This section briefly describes the five empirical cases 
that belong to this multiple case study analysis. The 
individual case report were published earlier, but this 
section summarizes their main research results with 
regard to this MCSR. 
 
  
4.1 Case I: The RIESCA Project 
The RIESCA – Rescuing of Intelligence and 
Electronic Security Core Applications – project was 
a Finnish national research project with 13 partners 
that lasted 42 months (01/10/2007 – 31/03/2010). It 
developed information security management 
techniques that can be used to ensure the proper 
functioning of critical systems in all circumstances. 
Particular attention was paid to the situation of 
moving from normality to a crisis situation and 
recovering from the crisis to a normal state. The other 
aim was to develop different security management 
and communication systems for critical events, 
including mass events, high-level political meetings 
and crisis situations and to assess methods for 
evaluating their functionality [13]. 
The RIESCA project developed a) usability 
analysis of critical functionalities, b) improvement of 
a process dealing with critical activities, c) a 
reliability framework, d) an audit framework, e) 
Corporate Governance survey, and f) implemented a 
survey tool all of which can be used to ensure the 
proper functioning of critical systems under all 
circumstances.  
The research partners of the project were the 
University of Oulu, University of Eastern Finland, 
and Laurea University of Applied Sciences. The main 
funder was Tekes – the Finnish Funding Agency for 
Innovation. Other participating organizations were 
dealing with critical infrastructure, either directly or 
indirectly. Organizational distribution was balanced 
act, three of them were on public sector, three of them 
represented small and medium sized organizations 
(SME), and three of them fall into industrial category. 
The international research partners were Georgia 
State University/J. Mack College of 
Business/Department of Computer Information 
Systems; USA; University of Arizona, USA; and The 
Central Information Technology Services 
Department (ZID) of the University of Innsbruck, 
Austria. 
During the project, researchers and university 
students, as research colleagues in co-operation with 
other RIESCA project researchers, analyzed existing 
standards and methods, and evaluated their 
applicability for the evaluation and development of 
critical systems and events. One target of the project 
was to create a process that could evaluate and 
develop security management for critical 
infrastructures. This was done by making as much 
use of existing methods and standards as possible. 
The pilot projects concerning these methods were 
mostly carried out with organizations that took part 
in the project. The whole process was supplemented 
by solutions that were developed during the project. 
RIESCA had societal impacts; it implicated 
national and international discussions in the field of 
critical infrastructure protection. RIESCA aligned 
with the key concepts regarding the 1st EU-US 
Expert Meeting on Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(CIP). Furthermore, RIESCA partially contributed on 
the improvement of the national authorities’ 
communities’ network (TUVE). RIESCA aided in 
creation of public-private-partnerships (PPP) 
between the participators and external partners. 
RIESCA increased networking with international 
actors, regarding the Infragard system, which was 
presented to Finnish actors. RIESCA raised 
discussions on privacy of citizens, as there was lot of 
discussions about privacy versus traceability of 
person. RIESCA raised awareness of the weaknesses 
of different networks with regard to dependability of 
networks. Furthermore, participators of RIESCA 
actively collaborated to different security related 
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standards and frameworks, such as the national 
“Vahti” group work and ISO/IEC standards. 
With regard to this paper, RIESCA’s main lesson 
to be learnt is that all critical infrastructures are 
software-intensive socio-technical systems, as shown 
in Fig. 3. There has been a gigantic shift from a 
hardware product based economy to one based on 
software and services [7]. This has also been the fact 
with regard to critical infrastructures. From every 
indication, the growth of the software layer, in size 
and percentage of the overall systems, will be the 
future trend. 
 
 
Fig.3 Critical infrastructures as software-
intensive socio-technical systems  
 
 
4.2 Case II: The MACICO Project 
The MACICO – Multi-Agency Cooperation In 
Cross-border Operations – project (01/12/2012 – 
31/12/2014) addresses the interactions and research 
and development of security organizations and cross-
border processes.     The shared MACICO processes 
operates usually in dedicated networks and using of 
own systems and services, but which in some critical 
missions could directly and indirectly benefit by 
respective sharing of external activities, distribution 
of mission critical information, and sharing of 
information systems or information intensive 
infrastructure.    In a short-term scenario, MACICO 
project was addressed to the needs for improved 
systems, tools and equipment for radio 
communication in cross-border operations and 
during operations which were taking place on the 
territory of other member states as critical over 
border situations.  In a long-term perspective, 
MACICO encompassed the interoperability issues of 
European countries and for formulation of transition 
from currently deployed legacy networks into the 
future broad band networks [14]. 
With regard to this paper, MACICO’s main lesson 
to be learnt is that interoperability should be built on 
all levels (users, service providers, services, 
technologies), as shown in Fig. 4. Trust is the main 
issues within cross-organizational cooperation. 
 
 
Fig.4 Layers of interoperability  
 
 
4.3 Case III: The AIRBEAM Project 
The AIRBEAM (http://airbeam.eu/) - AIRBorne 
information for Emergency situation Awareness and 
Monitoring - (March, 2011 to February, 2015) is a 
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) project 
related to crisis management. The goal is to develop 
a multi-platform approach to situational awareness 
for crisis management, especially utilizing 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), aerostatic 
platforms and satellites. In addition to Airbus, the 
AIRBEAM Consortium includes 22 partners, 
including some of the largest high-tech companies in 
Europe. The role of Laurea is as the coordinator of 
Work Package 1 of AIRBEAM, which focuses on 
studying potential concepts of use and specifying 
end-user requirements. This work is in close 
collaboration with end-user organizations. 
 
Fig.5 Situational awareness as a prerequisite 
for resilience  
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Situational Awareness is the main prerequisite 
towards cyber security. Without situational 
awareness, it is impossible to systematically prevent, 
identify, and protect the system from the cyber 
incidents and if, for example, a cyber-attack happens, 
to recover from the attack. Situational awareness 
involves being aware of what is happening around 
your system to understand how information, events, 
and how your own actions affect the goals and 
objectives, both now and in the near future. It also 
enables to select effective and efficient 
countermeasures, and thus, to protect the system 
from varying threats and attacks [15]. 
Fig. 5 illustrates that a situational awareness (SA) 
system itself is a cyber-physical system, cyber SA 
being a subset of it. Situational awareness is a 
prerequisite for a cyber-physical system to be 
resilient. 
 
 
4.4 Case IV: The HARMONISE Project 
The general aim of HARMONISE - A Holistic 
Approach to Resilience and Systematic Actions to 
Make Large Scale Built Infrastructure Secure - is to 
develop a comprehensive, multi-faceted, yet 
mutually reinforcing concept for the enhanced 
security, resilience and sustainability of urban 
infrastructure and development. HARMONISE will 
result in resilience enhancement methods for large 
scale urban built infrastructure. It will see the 
development of a concept to improve the security and 
resilience of this infrastructure, encompassing the 
design and planning phases of such projects (and 
thereby leading to robust built infrastructure 
invulnerable to natural/man-made disasters). 
HARMONISE will improve the design and planning 
of urban areas, thereby increasing their security and 
resilience to new threats. 
Specifically HARMONISE seeks to deliver: a) A 
holistic and interactive online HARMONISE 
Platform; b) A suite of innovative tools (toolkit 
hosted within the HARMONISE platform) for 
decision support; c) Greater understanding and 
awareness of urban security and resilience vis-a-vis 
dissemination activities; and, d) Commercialization 
and employment opportunities among emerging new 
markets in this field. The HARMONISE concept will 
be applied across a number of European cities 
through the use of case studies for validation and 
refinement. 
Recent international work in urban resilience has 
charted a number of commonalities in how different 
jurisdictions adopt, and then enhance, their resilience 
over time in a series of ‘waves’. These accounts 
highlight how resilience has, over time, become more 
local, proactive and embedded within the everyday 
practices of built environment professionals, as 
shown in Fig. 6 [16]. 
 
 
4.5 Case V: The INACHUS Project 
The INACHUS FP7 project aims to achieve a 
significant time reduction related to Urban Search 
and Rescue (USaR) phase by providing wide-area 
situation awareness solutions for improved detection 
and localisation of the trapped victims assisted by 
simulation tools for predicting structural failures and 
a holistic decision support mechanism incorporating 
operational procedures and resources of relevant 
actors. The INACHUS objectives are: 
1. Development of simulation tools for estimating 
the number and locations of survival spaces created 
after a structural collapse. 
2. Development of Decision and Planning 
Components for Advanced Casualty and Damage 
Estimation performing structural damage analysis 
based on input coming from: i) 3-D airborne and 
ground-based laser-scanning, ii) images  and iii) 
Structural Health Monitoring sensors. 
3. Integration of existing and novel sensors as well 
as advanced “electronic nose” based on off-the-shelf 
sensors for accurate localization and detection of 
alive trapped humans. 
4. INACHUS will advance the state of the art by 
developing a robust snake robot mechanism. 
5. Interconnection between the developed devices 
providing an integrated architecture on a network-
centric scheme to interconnect all needed sensors and 
 
Fig. 6   An evolving resilience process 
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actors via advanced and secure communication links, 
able to decrease time of reaction and drastically 
increase the efficiency of the relevant actors. 
6. Enhanced data fusion and analysis techniques 
to improve USaR operations with respect to response 
time and situational awareness. 
7. System Integration of all the above software 
and hardware subcomponents (INACHUS platform). 
8. Contribution to standards/best practices and 
guidelines for the USaR operations through strong 
user presence. 
9. Consideration of Societal Impact, Legal and 
Ethical issues of the proposed solution feeding the 
technical solutions and guidelines of its use. 
10. Several field tests will be arranged targeting a 
variety of post-disaster situations aiming at 
demonstrating the capabilities of the developed 
INACHUS platform. 
11. Development of training package and 
extensive training courses will be carried out for the 
first responders. 
With regard to this paper, INACHUS’ main 
lesson to be learnt is that all critical cyber-physical 
systems have interdependences, but their internal 
event management cycles could be in different phase, 
as shown in figure 6. This should be considered when 
shaping overall situational awareness. 
 
 
5 Cross-case Conclusions 
Developing resilience management of critical cyber-
physical systems requires a deep understanding of 
their characteristics and the interdependencies it 
engenders at all levels (from macro to micro). 
 
 
Fig. 8 Cognitive domain and situational awareness of CPS 
 
 
Fig. 7 Event management cycles of critical 
infrastructes 
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Building on clearly-defined terms to allow coherent 
interdisciplinary work, the challenge is then to 
understand the consequences of techno-social 
interactions. Maintaining the advantages of the smart 
city environment without compromising security, 
resilience, safety and privacy represents a challenge 
requiring broad input and deep understanding, 
especially in the areas of analysis and modelling. The 
challenge in these areas is to bring together cross-
disciplinary teams for developing new and 
combining existing techniques, in order to provide a 
coherent framework to support implementation. 
Situational awareness (SA) and learning are 
prerequisites for resilience. Every critical system, as 
Fig. 8 illustrates, needs its own SA system and 
cognitive domain. Because critical CPS have 
interconnections their SA systems and cognitive 
domains cannot be isolated ones. Also, cyber SA 
cannot be treated in isolation, but it is intertwined 
with and a part of the overall SA. Cyber SA indeed 
concerns awareness regarding cyber issues but these 
need to be combined with other information to obtain 
full understanding regarding the situation. Cognitive 
domain is very important for resilience; it uses the 
cyber and physical domains to make decisions. 
There has been a gap between basic research on 
security and technology and the applied 
experimentally-driven research and open and social 
innovation carried out by Living Labs across Europe. 
The potential of Living Lab as a validation, 
information collection and cooperation platform in 
security and systems research has not been fully 
exploited. At the same time the extensive network of 
Urban Living Labs in Europe offers big potential for 
developments and cooperation on these topics. 
Smart city concept is an example of a cyber-
physical system. There has been a lack of knowledge 
and awareness among city management and regional 
authorities on system concepts, tools and new 
opportunities provided by advanced ICT. It is 
therefore important to stimulate dialog with them and 
encourage their participation in the network of 
scientific communities. Involvement of citizens in 
research through participation in Living Lab 
activities will help the authorities introduce services 
that will better serve their communities in multiple 
societal security domains. 
The future aim should be to build a 
multidisciplinary community of researchers, 
authorities, industry and Living Labs to develop a 
scientific foundation and platform for partnership in 
system research and a federated Living Lab 
environment for Secure Smart Cities. It will create a 
network of research experts and groups to 
consolidate the multidisciplinary expertise necessary 
to tackle this complex area of high societal 
importance. 
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